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Abstract 
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution 
mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate 
conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of 
binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to 
the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are 
mitigated to a greater extent for groups that opt-in to the conflict resolution 
mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher 
when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, 
commitment problems are greatly reduced among those groups who choose to 
opt-in.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Schelling (1960) initiated the formal study of conflict, economists and others have 
developed numerous models highlighting the resources wasted when conflict occurs (Tullock, 
1980; Konrad, 2009). Empirical studies testing these models indicate that in practice the costs of 
conflict are substantially higher than predicted by the theory (Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux et al., 
2015). For this reason, there has been extensive research on mechanisms of conflict resolution 
that allow parties to avoid these costs, all of which depend on the ability to make credible 
commitments and/or binding contracts enforced by a third party (see e.g., Schelling, 1960; 
Williamson, 1985; Charness et al., 2007; Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013; Kimbrough et al., 
2014). Yet, in reality, many conflict resolution efforts cannot rely on credible commitments or 
enforceable contracts.  
The problems associated with the inability to commit are well known: in the absence of 
credible commitment, parties on the less favored side of any proposed resolution face incentives 
to ignore the resolution. Such commitment problems arise both on a macro level between 
countries and competing economies, as well as on a micro level between individuals. For 
example, a country that finds a UN resolution counter to its interests could simply exit the 
organization and ignore the international community. A similar commitment problem can help to 
explain the failures of recent WTO negotiations and the Kyoto Protocol as well as the difficulty 
of enforcing nuclear restrictions in North Korea and Iran.1 Agreements between individuals often 
face similar problems, especially when third-party enforcement mechanisms are unavailable. 
Historically, weak and decentralized political rule made many contractual agreements legally 
unenforceable (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif et al., 1994; Greif, 2000), and similar troubles plague 
                                                        
1 See Powell (2006) for a discussion of commitment problems and armed conflict between nations. 
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contemporary societies where the rule of law is absent or weak. Even when the rule of law is 
present many contracts remain unenforceable, and commitment problems arise due to imperfect 
information and incomplete contracts (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Holmström, 1979; Baker, 1992; 
Tirole, 1999). 
Given the ubiquity of commitment problems in conflict resolution, there has been 
surprisingly little empirical work exploring the possibility of conflict resolution in the absence of 
binding commitments.2 Some conflict resolution mechanisms have been examined in the lab, 
including side-payment agreements (Charness et al., 2007; Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013, 
2014), pre-commitment to an allocation proposed by a random device (Kimbrough et al., 2014), 
communication (Cason et al., 2013), and repeated interactions (Lacomba et al., 2014). Also, 
some animal behavior studies indicate that many non-human species employ non-binding 
resource-allocation conventions built around asymmetries between parties that are uncorrelated 
with their fighting abilities (Petrie et al., 1991; Maher and Lott, 2000).3 The main difference of 
our paper is that we examine an environment in which parties may choose to ignore their 
previously made commitments to a conflict resolution mechanism. This is a crucial difference 
that allows us to examine commitment problems in conflict resolution. 
In this paper, we explore whether (and how) non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms 
reduce conflict and overcome commitment problems. We conduct an experiment where 
participants face potential conflict over a valuable, indivisible resource. Parties may choose to 
                                                        
2 See, for example, the review of experimental literature on conflicts by Dechenaux et al. (2015). 
3 An important difference between the papers cited in this paragraph, as well as the present paper, and other papers 
in the literature on commitment in contests is that in these papers parties can make irreversible outlays to increase 
the likelihood of conflict resolution that do not affect the probability of winning the conflict should conflict occur. 
This is unlike Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) and Skaperdas (2006), for instance, where individuals can invest in 
arming themselves or in litigation, either of which increase their probability of winning should conflict occur but 
also make conflict less likely to happen in the first place under certain conditions. We refrain from considering such 
an environment because we are concerned with the possibility of conflict resolution via an independent third party. 
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allocate the resource by costly conflict (i.e., a rent-seeking contest), or they can choose to 
employ a conflict resolution mechanism that allocates the resource at random (i.e., a coin flip), 
allowing them to avoid the costs of fighting. However, for this mechanism to be effective, both 
participants must first opt-in to learn the proposed allocation and then mutually commit to the 
outcome. If either party chooses not to commit, the parties fight over the resource. In the stage 
game, the indivisibility of the resource is crucial because it creates a “hard case” for conflict 
resolution efforts: commitment requires one party to accept inequality.  
In our experiment the game is finitely repeated in fixed groups of two subjects. Money-
maximizing game theoretic arguments for finitely repeated games predict that even if both 
parties opt-in to observe the proposed allocation, the losing party will never commit to the 
outcome. However, if we relax the assumption of homogenous agents, and instead allow for the 
existence of ‘types’, then in repeated setting a strategic agent might mimic a cooperative type 
and commit to the outcome. While the stage game is different from our own, other analytical 
work solves for the equilibrium behavior where a strategic agent mimics the behavior of another 
‘cooperative type’ before revealing their true type (e.g., Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Kreps et al., 
1982).4 Also, if one allows for subjects to have other-regarding social preference (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999), then cooperation can be sustained in finitely repeated games. Indeed, existing 
experimental studies provides evidence of cooperation (Camerer, 2003) which is not predicted 
by a finitely repeated game theoretic analysis but which can be rationalized by the existence of 
‘types’ and/or pro-social preferences. In light of this work, the repeated nature of our game may 
allow subjects to avoid the costs of conflict by mutually agreeing to conflict resolution in each 
                                                        
4 Kreps and Wilson (1982) solve a sequential equilibrium in a finitely repeated entry-deterrence game. Kreps, 
Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) solve for a sequential equilibrium in a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma 
game. 
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period – effectively taking turns receiving the prize. Since the conflict resolution mechanism is 
unbiased and procedurally fair (a coin flip), with repetition, expected payoffs for a cooperating 
pair are equal and double the expected earnings from conflict. Thus, given the potential gains 
from cooperation, individuals may agree to avoid conflict despite such behavior being 
inconsistent with the money-maximizing equilibrium. 
Our treatments are designed to explore the willingness of individuals to commit to such 
conflict mitigating agreements in three settings that help us understand their motivations for 
commitment. The Exogenous-Free treatment, in which there is no opt-in decision and all pairs 
see the proposed random allocation, allows us to measure the willingness to commit in a strict 
test of the model. The Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments, in which parties 
must first opt-in to learn the proposed allocation and then choose whether to commit, allow us to 
examine alternative mechanisms for encouraging cooperation. In particular, these treatments are 
motivated by the idea that endogenizing the decision to employ an institution may increase that 
institution’s effectiveness by encouraging individuals to adhere to it. This effect may operate 
through a number of channels: (1) endogenizing the decision may increase the “legitimacy” of 
the proposed allocation, (2) it may increase the expected costs of conflict by encouraging 
retaliation by those who receive the resource provisionally and then learn that their counterpart 
has rejected the proposed allocation, and (3) the act of opting-in may reveal information about a 
player’s willingness to adhere to the institution, particularly when opting-in is costly (i.e., in the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment, opting-in may be seen as “expensive talk”).  
In fact, we observe many instances in which individuals avoid conflict by committing to 
the outcome of a coin flip; conflict resolution rates range between 20%-54%, depending on the 
treatment. We also observe endgame effects that suggest that at least some observed commitment 
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is strategic, consistent with the idea that our repeated game facilitates cooperation. Commitment 
problems are further mitigated when groups endogenously choose to opt-in to the conflict 
resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when 
opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed (in many instances pairs do not 
opt-in), commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups that opt-in. This is 
inconsistent with models that are typically offered to explain cooperation in repeated settings. 
For example, a standard model incorporating social preferences into a contest setting (e.g., 
Sheremeta, 2015) would predict a difference between conflict expenditures of flip winners and 
losers, for which we do not find any evidence. Moreover, conditional on conflict, social 
preferences would predict similar expenditures across treatments, for which again we do not find 
evidence. Instead, our data are consistent with the idea that costly opting-in may serve as a 
credible signal of a participant’s willingness to cooperate in the finitely repeated game. 
Thus, our paper makes two key contributions. First, we provide evidence that conflict 
resolution efforts can overcome commitment problems. This suggests that the prospects for 
reducing the costs of conflict are not as bleak as theory would suggest (Tullock, 1980; Konrad, 
2009). This finding assumes additional importance given the extensive experimental literature 
demonstrating the very high costs of conflict (Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015).5 
Second, we show that imposing explicit costs for using conflict resolution mechanisms can 
further mitigate commitment problems. A costly mechanism serves two purposes: it encourages 
reciprocity because parties both know that their counterpart paid a cost to potentially avoid 
conflict, and it facilitates self-selection, since individuals who are unwilling to commit are less 
                                                        
5 Sheremeta (2013) reviews 30 conflict experiments and finds that in 28 of those experiments individuals exert 
significantly higher conflict expenditures than predicted. In some conflict experiments the expenditures are so high 
that the majority of individuals earn negative payoffs (Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; 
Deck and Sheremeta, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2014). 
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likely to incur the cost in the first place.6 Thus, we argue that designers of conflict resolution 
mechanisms should consider ways of ensuring that parties are invested in the conflict resolution 
process, and we hope that theorists can further develop models to explain the source of this 
effect. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
2.1. Experimental Design 
Our experiment employs a simple conflict resolution game in which participants play a finitely 
repeated game with a known ending, repeatedly bargaining over an indivisible resource valued at 
v by both players. The game, shown in Figure 1, consists of three stages. In stage 1, participants 
choose whether or not to use the conflict resolution device by choosing either ‘Flip’ or ‘Don’t 
Flip’. If at least one participant chooses Don’t Flip then neither participant incurs any cost, and 
both proceed to stage 3. If both participants choose to Flip then they each incur a cost c, and after 
observing a realization of a fair coin flip, which randomly assigns the resource to one player, 
they proceed to stage 2. In stage 2, participants decide whether to ‘Agree’ to the proposed 
allocation. If both participants choose Agree (i.e., if they choose to commit) then the participant 
who was favored by the coin flip receives v = 100 francs, and the game is over. However, if at 
least one participant chooses ‘Don’t Agree’, then both participants proceed to stage 3. In stage 3, 
both participants participate in a lottery contest to allocate the resource. In the lottery contest, 
both participants make irreversible conflict expenditures e1, e2  [0, v] to increase their 
probabilities of receiving the prize. Specifically, for participant 1 (similarly for participant 2), the 
                                                        
6 There is a large literature in biology suggesting that costly signals are more reliable than cheap signals (Zahavi, 
1975, 1993; Grafen, 1990; Petrie et al., 1991). Likewise, there is a significant literature in the economics of religion 
suggesting that costly or stigmatizing religious rituals dramatically increase cooperation within religious “clubs” 
(Iannaccone, 1992, 1994; Berman, 2000; Abramitzky, 2008; Aimone et al., 2013; Carvalho, 2013). 
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probability of receiving is p1(e1,e2) = e1/(e1 + e2); if both players bid 0, the allocation is 
determined by flipping a fair coin. 
Using backward induction and assuming risk neutrality, we examine the last occurrence 
of the finitely repeated game. The Nash equilibrium in stage 3 is for both participants to choose 
expenditures of e1* = e2* = 25 (Tullock, 1980), receiving the expected payoff of 25 each (v/2 – 
e* = 50 – 25). Because each participant has a positive expected value from conflict in stage 3, a 
participant interested in maximizing her wealth should never commit to the outcome after losing 
the coin flip. Therefore, in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, money-maximizing 
participants end up in a conflict stage 3 regardless of the cost of the coin flip c and exert wasteful 
expenditures competing for the resource.7 Since conflict is certain along the equilibrium path, it 
follows that participants are indifferent between opting-in and not opting-in if and only if the 
cost of opting-in is zero (i.e., c = 0), and they should never opt-in when doing so is costly (i.e., c 
> 0). 
To examine whether a non-binding coin flip can reduce the cost of conflict, we employ a 
partial two-by-two experimental design. On one dimension, we vary whether the decision to opt-
in is endogenous or exogenous, and on the other dimension, we vary whether opting-in carries a 
cost. For obvious reasons, we impose the cost only when opting-in is endogenous, hence our 
partial design. In the Exogenous-Free baseline treatment, participants first observe the outcome 
of a coin flip. That is, there is no stage 1 decision to ‘Flip’ or ‘Don’t Flip’; instead, the ‘Flip’ 
decision is exogenously imposed. In stage 2, participants decide whether to commit to the 
outcome. If either participant disagrees then the game proceeds to stage 3. In stage 3, participants 
                                                        
7 While we focus on the case of risk-neutrality, we can extend this argument to cases in which players have 
symmetric levels of risk-aversion. In such cases, there exists an equilibrium of the Tullock contest with positive 
expenditures and positive expected payoff, so that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium described remains 
qualitatively unchanged, with players always ending up in conflict. 
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participate in a simple two-person contest for the resource valued at 100. In the Endogenous-
Free treatment, participants first endogenously decide whether to observe the outcome of a coin 
flip for free in stage 1. Then in stage 2 they decide whether to commit to the outcome. If either 
participant disagrees in either stage 1 or stage 2 then the game proceeds to stage 3. Finally, the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment is similar to the Endogenous-Free treatment, but opting-in in stage 
1 is costly, i.e., c = 5 francs.  
 
2.2. Experimental Procedures 
To study behavior in the proposed treatments, a total of 198 participants were recruited at 
random from the subject-pool consisting of graduate and undergraduate students at a private 
university in the United States. Participants received a participation fee for arriving to the 
experiment on time and received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each session. 
Participants were randomly assigned into treatments (44 in Exogenous-Free, 62 in Endogenous-
Free and 92 in Endogenous-Costly) and nobody participated more than once.8 Participants sat at, 
and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and instructions were read aloud by the 
experimenter as participants followed along on paper (see the online Appendix A for 
instructions). The experiments were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the 
experiment began participants took a quiz (non-incentivized) to confirm their understanding of 
the experimental procedures. An experimenter reviewed the quiz answers and privately answered 
questions. 
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a group of two and remained within this group for all 30 periods of the 
                                                        
8 Our design was unbalanced to generate comparable sample sizes for the commitment decision across treatments. 
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experiment (fixed matching). We chose a fixed matching protocol because we believe that it is 
more realistic, as most interactions in the real world are repeated (especially macro level 
conflicts between countries and competing economies). In such a setting, participants seeking to 
avoid costly conflict might be more motivated than in one-shot games to signal their desire to 
other group members. Moreover, the fact that we chose the fixed matching protocol does not 
affect the comparison across treatments (as the same protocol was used in all three treatments).9 
In every session, each period proceeded according to one of the treatments. In stage 1 
participants chose between `Flip’ and `Don’t Flip’ (except in the Exogenous-Free treatment). In 
stage 2, those who opted to see the coin flip chose between `Agree’ and `Don’t Agree’ after 
seeing the result of the flip. In stage 3, participants chose to expend any number between 0 and 
100 francs, in order to increase the probability of winning the prize of 100 francs. At the end of 
each period, the computer displayed individual decisions, as well as corresponding payoffs, to 
each participant. 
At the end of each experimental session, participants completed a brief demographic 
survey and their total earnings from all 30 periods of the experiment were added to or subtracted 
from an initial endowment of 2,000 francs (which we described as a participation fee). We 
converted francs to USD at a rate of 100 francs = $1, and participants were paid privately in cash 
and dismissed from the experiment. The average experimental earnings, including the $20 
participation fee, were $25.24, ranging from a low of $16.00 to a high of $46.70. Sessions lasted 
approximately one hour each. 
 
                                                        
9 Baik et al. (2013) examined behavior of subjects in contests using fixed-matching and random-matching protocols 
and found no difference in expenditure levels. Similarly, in a meta-analysis of experimental contest studies, 
Sheremeta (2013) found that the matching protocol has no significant impact on contest expenditures. 
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3. Results 
We observed early period variation that settled down after a few periods and endgame effects, 
both of which introduced noise into our data. Thus, we restrict our analysis to periods 5-29.10 
Table 1 reports average frequency of conflict resolution, opting-in and commitment, as well as 
conflict expenditures and payoffs. We also report the statistical significance of estimated 
treatment effects for each of the outcome variables of interest. To control for repeated measures, 
our ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions use each pair averaged over all periods as a single 
observation.11 Rows 1, 2 and 6 of Table 1 examine averages based upon all 25 periods, and rows 
3-5 examine averages conditional upon entering stage 2 or stage 3. In rows 3-5, we use 
probability weighting to control for the fact that each pair was observed making those decisions a 
different number of times (and thus has a different variance). We report two-sided p-values. 
 
3.1. Conflict Resolution 
In the Exogenous-Free treatment, pairs avoided conflict 54% of the time (i.e., they agree to the 
result of the Flip), while in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments, pairs 
avoided conflict 41% and 20% of the time, respectively. OLS regression analysis indicates that 
the rate of conflict resolution is significantly lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in 
the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments (p-values < 0.01), while there is no 
significant difference between the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments (p-value = 
0.22). 
                                                        
10 None of our results are qualitatively altered when we vary these cutoffs, and additional regression output is 
available from the authors upon request. We examine end-game effects in Section 3.6.1. 
11 The results are comparable if using non-parametric analysis (i.e., Wilcoxon rank-sum test) when each pair has the 
same number of observations (i.e., rows 1, 2 and 6). Heterogeneity in the rates at which pairs reach stage 2 and 3 
render non-parametric analysis inappropriate for rows 3-5. 
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Result 1: There is substantial conflict resolution in all three treatments, although pairs avoid 
conflict more frequently in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments than in the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment. 
 
This finding provides support for the idea that non-binding conflict resolution 
mechanisms can reduce the frequency of conflict, despite incentives to renege. When using the 
mechanism is a default, some groups are able to coordinate on a reciprocal strategy in which the 
losing party is willing to accept an unfavorable resolution. However, the mechanism is far from 
perfect. When the decision to use the mechanism is endogenous and costly, conflict frequency 
increased as some groups opted not to see the coin flip. Similarly, there is extensive 
heterogeneity in the willingness to commit to the outcome, which we discuss further in Section 
3.5. 
 
3.2. Opting-In 
A major source of increased conflict in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments 
is failure to opt-in to the coin flip mechanism. While pairs were required to see the flip in the 
Exogenous-Free treatment, they opted to see the coin flip 71% of the time in the Endogenous-
Free treatment and only 26% of the time in the Endogenous-Costly treatment. OLS regression 
analysis indicates that the rate of opting-in is significantly lower in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment (p-value < 0.01). Here we exclude the 
Exogenous-Free treatment from the regression since all pairs were forced to see the coin flip. 
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Result 2: Subjects opted-in to the coin flip mechanism less frequently in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment, although the likelihood was far greater than 0 
(and less than 1) in both treatments. 
 
While it is clear that the cost of observing the coin flip played an important role in 
reducing the frequency with which participants opted-in in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, the 
reasons are less clear in the Endogenous-Free treatment. In theory, participants should be 
indifferent between observing the coin flip and not observing the flip. However, if there was any 
probability that a player who lost the flip would tremble and mistakenly accept the outcome, 
players would strictly prefer to flip the coin. Unfortunately, our design does not allow us to test 
this hypothesis directly. 
 
3.3. Commitment 
The money-maximizing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts that participants losing the 
coin flip will never commit to the outcome in a finitely repeated game. Comparing averages 
across treatments in Table 1, we found that the probability that both parties committed to the 
outcome (conditional on seeing the flip) were 54% in the Exogenous-Free, 58% in the 
Endogenous-Free, and 76% in the Endogenous-Costly treatment. Probability weighted OLS 
regression analysis indicates that the conditional probability that both parties commit to the coin 
flip resolution is higher in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the Endogenous-Free (p-
value = 0.08) and Exogenous-Free (p-value = 0.03) treatments. 
The treatment differences were almost solely driven by an increased willingness of 
participants who lose the coin flip to commit to its outcome. The conditional probability of 
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committing to the flip among those receiving unfavorable outcomes was 58% in the Exogenous-
Free, 61% in the Endogenous-Free, and 78% in the Endogenous-Costly treatment.12 To provide 
statistical support for treatment differences in the loser’s commitment decisions, we estimate an 
additional regression. The dependent variable is the probability that the loser of the coin flip in 
each pair committed to the coin flip, conditional on seeing it, and the independent variables are 
treatment dummies. The coefficient on the Endogenous-Costly treatment is positive and 
significant (p-value = 0.05), and the difference between the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-
Costly coefficients is marginally significant (p-value = 0.10). These findings are summarized in 
Result 3.  
 
Result 3: The conditional probability of commitment is higher in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment than either in the Endogenous-Free or Exogenous-Free treatments. There is no 
significant difference between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments. 
 
These results suggest that merely endogenizing the decision to seek third-party conflict 
resolution does not have an impact on the probability that parties commit to the proposed 
resolution – we find no difference in commitment rates in the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-
Free treatments. However, the commitment problem is significantly mitigated when both parties 
must incur a cost to learn the proposed allocation. 
The relationship between opting-in and the commitment problem in the Endogenous-Free 
and Endogenous-Costly treatments is demonstrated in Figure 2, which plots the relative 
frequency of opting-in against the conditional probability of commitment for each pair with 
                                                        
12 In all treatments the conditional probability of commitment for flip winners was at least 95%. Rejections are 
concentrated in a few individuals (44 of the 76 rejections come from 9 of 198 participants, three per treatment). 
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smoothing splines fit to the data by treatment.13 Only the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-
Costly treatments are plotted, since participants in the Exogenous-Free treatment always saw the 
coin flip. Figure 2 indicates that there is a linear relationship between opting-in and committing 
to the outcome of the flip in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, but there is a convex relationship 
between the two in the Endogenous-Free treatment; indeed, there is a pair that sees the flip in 
every period, but never commits to the outcome. And, while the Endogenous-Costly treatment 
data is roughly symmetrically distributed around the 45-degree line, every Endogenous-Free 
treatment observation lies on or below the line. In the Endogenous-Free treatment, commitment 
is regularly sustained only at high rates of opting-in. This provides further evidence that the 
opportunity cost of opting-in in the Endogenous-Costly treatment facilitates the solution of the 
commitment problem, while the absence of such a cost in the Endogenous-Free treatment 
renders the cooperative signal less informative and is thus less effective at encouraging 
commitment. 
 
3.4. Conflict Expenditures 
If groups did not opt-in or failed to solve the commitment problem, the group entered the conflict 
stage in which they exerted expenditures to win the prize.14 Returning to Table 1, note that the 
average expenditure, conditional on reaching stage 3, was greatest in the Exogenous-Free 
treatment (28.6), followed by the Endogenous-Free treatment (24.6), and the least in the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment (18.6). 15  OLS regression analysis indicates that conflict 
                                                        
13 An alternative figure containing data from all 30 periods is in Appendix B. 
14 Figures B1-B3 in Appendix B report time series of conflict expenditures for each pair by treatment. 
15 Although we did not run a control treatment without the coin flip, our results in the Exogenous-Free treatment are 
very similar to those that have been observed in the existing experimental literature. In a meta-analysis of 30 
experiments on contests, Sheremeta (2013) provides estimation results of a regression that can be used by 
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expenditures are significantly lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the Exogenous-
Free treatment (p-value = 0.03). Expenditures are marginally lower in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment (p-value = 0.08). There is no significant 
difference between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments (p-value = 0.41). 
  
Result 4: Conflict expenditures are lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in either the 
Exogenous-Free or the Endogenous-Free treatment. There is no statistically significant 
difference between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments. 
 
3.5. Between-Pair Heterogeneity 
Figure 3 displays, for each pair in each treatment, the relative frequency of opting-in, conditional 
frequency of commitment, and average payoff, where the pairs are sorted from left to right in 
each panel by opting-in rate with ties broken by commitment rate and then average payoff.  
In the Endogenous-Free treatment, there is a significant positive correlation between a 
pair’s observed probability of opting-in and average payoff (ρ = 0.62, p-value < 0.01) but in the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment, this relationship is not statistically significant (ρ = 0.23, p-value = 
0.12). This is driven by a number of pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment that never opted-
in to see the coin flip but nevertheless received very high payoffs. 
It is possible to visually identify three types of pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment: 
(1) pairs with a high rate of both opting-in and commitment, (2) pairs with low (but positive) 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
researchers to compare their results to other studies. We have also used this regression to compare our results. When 
using the endowment equal to the prize value (endowment = 1) in a two-player contest (n = 2) with fixed matching 
(fixed = 1), we should expect 14% of over-expenditures in a control treatment without a coin flip. The actual over-
expenditure in the Exogenous-Free treatment is 14.4% (28.6/25 = 1.144), which is remarkably close to the expected 
over-expenditure of 14%. 
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rates of both opting-in and commitment, and (3) pairs with zero rates of opting-in. Heuristically, 
we define high flip pairs as those with opting-in rates in the interval (0.5, 1], low flip pairs as 
those with opting-in rates in (0, 0.5], and no flip pairs as those with opting-in rates of exactly 0. 
High flip pairs earn on average 84 francs/period (SD = 6.77), low flip pairs earn 49 francs/period 
(SD = 30.13), and no flip pairs earn 73 francs/period (SD = 20.01). Interestingly, 5 of the no flip 
pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment (i.e., pairs that engaged in conflict in each period 5-29) 
generated average earnings greater than the maximum that could be earned per period by opting-
in and committing in every period (i.e., greater than 90 francs). None of the no flip pairs in the 
Endogenous-Free treatment were able to generate average earnings greater than 90 francs. 
While our data do not allow us to directly identify the source of this behavior, we 
conjecture the positive commitment cost generated an endogenous focal point for conflict 
expenditures that allowed some pairs to coordinate on expenditures far below the Nash 
equilibrium of 25. Specifically, we observe a number of pairs in which individuals consistently 
submit bids less than or equal to 5 (the cost of opting-in). This suggests that they attempt to 
cooperate and tacitly agree to only engage in conflict that leaves them better off in expectation 
than conflict resolution by the random device we have offered them. Such strategies are not 
always effective, but some pairs manage to sustain them, and attempts by other pairs to 
implement them tend to drive conflict expenditures down. Thus, Wald tests on the regression 
reported in row 5 of Table 1 cannot reject the null hypotheses that the average conflict 
expenditure for the Exogenous-Free or Endogenous-Free treatments is equal to the Nash 
Equilibrium value of 25 (p-value = 0.92 and p-value = 0.35, respectively). However, in the 
Exogenous-Costly treatment the average expenditure is significantly less than 25 (p-value < 
0.01). When we exclude the no flip pairs and run a new regression that is otherwise identical, the 
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average expenditure in the Endogenous-Costly treatment rises and is not significantly different 
from 25 (p-value = 0.97). 
 
3.6 Dynamics of Behavior 
In this section, we highlight a number of interesting features of our data that we found after 
testing our main hypotheses. Specifically, we focus on behavioral dynamics, emphasizing 
patterns in the data that are inconsistent with the equilibrium of the finitely repeated game but 
nevertheless appear important for understanding behavior in our setting. Given the endogeneity 
issues with this analysis, we report summary statistics only, avoiding statistical tests. 
 
3.6.1 Endgame Effects 
As noted above, our main analysis excludes the final period because of the presence of endgame 
effects. Table 2 displays comparisons of opt-in rates, commitment rates, and conflict 
expenditures over periods 20-29 and period 30. Note that pairs in all treatments opt-in at roughly 
equal rates in periods 20-29 and period 30, but in the final period, the data reveal a sharp 
decrease in commitment rates. In fact, even those who win the coin flip are slightly less likely to 
commit in period 30. This is particularly striking and puzzling in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment – if a player plans to opt-out, then there is no reason to incur the cost of seeing the flip 
in the first place. Nevertheless, the presence of an endgame effect is consistent with models of 
repeated games in which some players are cooperative types, and others, knowing this, cooperate 
strategically until revealing their true type eventually (e.g., Kreps et al., 1982). Not surprisingly, 
in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments, this endgame defection leads to 
some increase in conflict expenditures, perhaps either as retaliation or anticipation thereof. 
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Another interesting observation is that there are treatment differences in behavior in the 
conflict stage of those who were either the “victims” or the “instigators” of endgame defection. 
Consider only pairs that opted-in and agreed in period 29 and then also opted-in in period 30. We 
define victims as players who chose agree in period 30 when their partner, the instigator, chose 
don’t agree. In both Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments, victims respond to 
defection by submitting very high conflict expenditures (31 and 46, respectively), while 
instigators submit relatively low bids (17 and 24, respectively). In the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment, the pattern is reversed. Victims submit very small bids averaging 13 while instigators 
submit large bids averaging 34. Observed behavior in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free 
treatments can be rationalized as retaliation, and this is consistent with evidence in Kimbrough 
and Sheremeta (2013, 2014) in a related lottery contest environment that “reneging” leads to 
retaliation. The pattern in the Endogenous-Costly treatment is more puzzling. Compared to 
participants in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments, victims in the last period 
of Endogenous-Costly treatment had relatively little experience with bidding and defection. 
When there is opting-in and defection in the last round in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, then 
there was likely a history of cooperation (as prior defection in the Endogenous-Costly tended to 
result in subsequently not opting-in, see below). One possibility is that defection after paying to 
opt-in reveals new information about the defector’s type, which initially bewilders the victims 
(i.e. “this guy must be nuts”).  
 
3.6.2 Path Dependence 
While path dependence does not appear to move behavior within a pair in one direction or the 
other on average, it is an important driving force. To underscore the in-group dynamics over 
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time, Table 3 presents a transition matrix of actions. The top panel reports how a group’s choice 
of whether to see the flip in period t affects their decision to see the flip in period t + 1 (note that 
subjects automatically see the flip in the Exogenous-Free treatment).16 There is no discernable 
trend in the Endogenous-Free treatment; subjects choose to flip at relatively consistent and high 
rates (0.82-0.92) regardless of their own and their partner’s behavior in the previous period. In 
the Endogenous-Costly treatment, however, it appears that there are two “types”: those that 
frequently see the flip and those that do not, regardless of their partner’s actions. Those that are 
willing to pay to see the flip in period t (note that they only actually pay if their partner chooses 
to see the flip too) choose to see the flip in period t + 1 with probability 0.71 if their partner 
chose to see the flip in period t and with probability 0.67 if their partner did not. On the other 
hand, those that do not choose to see the flip in period t also do not choose to see the flip in 
period t + 1 with probability 0.75 (since they do not see the flip, they do not know what their 
partner chose). 
The second panel analyzes the effect of subjects’ decisions whether to agree to the 
outcome of the flip (conditional on seeing the flip) on their decision to see the flip in the next 
period. Again, there is no discernable trend in the Endogenous-Free treatment. Subjects choose 
to see the flip at relatively consistent and high rates (0.80-0.88) regardless of their own and their 
partner’s behavior in the previous period. In the Endogenous-Costly treatment, however, the 
decision to accept the outcome or not in period t clearly affects the (costly) choice to see the flip 
in the following period. When a subject and her partner agree to the outcome of the flip, she 
chooses to see the flip in the following period with probability 0.78. In other words, when both 
                                                        
16 In Appendix B, we report a transition matrix that focuses solely on the actions of those who lost the flip in the 
previous period. Not surprisingly, results are nearly identical to those in Table 3. Since over 95% of flip winners 
agreed to the outcome in all treatments, most of the dynamics we find in Table 3 come from flip losers. 
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players cooperate, they use the mechanism that facilitated their cooperation in the following 
period over three-quarters of the time. However, when one subject does not agree to the outcome 
in period t, subjects choose to see the flip only around half of the time (0.48-0.51). This suggests 
that, amongst those pairs who choose to see the flip, uncooperative behavior makes cooperation 
much harder to sustain in the future. 
Finally, the third panel reveals how a subject’s willingness to agree to the outcome of the 
flip in period t (conditional on seeing the flip) affects their willingness to agree to the outcome of 
the flip in period t + 1 (if there is a flip). These are most important results presented in this table, 
since they shed light on how cooperation is sustained over time. In the Exogenous-Free 
treatment, there is no discernable inter-period effect: both players tend to agree to the flip a little 
more than half of the time (0.52-0.56) regardless of actions in the previous period. In the 
Endogenous-Free treatment, an unexpected result arises: cooperation rates are higher in period t 
+ 1 if both players did not agree in the previous period (0.50) than if they did (0.27). There is no 
obvious interpretation of this result, but it does at the very least suggest that subjects are not 
coordinating around the random device when viewing the outcome is free. We find substantial 
path dependence in the Endogenous-Costly treatment. Groups in which both subjects agree in 
period t (conditional on seeing the flip) see the flip and agree to its outcome in period t + 1 with 
probability 0.69. On the other hand, when at least one subject does not agree to the outcome of 
the flip in period t, groups only agree to the outcome of the flip in period t + 1 with probability 
0.08, and they do not see the flip, which is costly to view, with probability 0.77. This suggests 
that the cost of seeing the flip encourages path dependence: those that agree to the outcome of 
the flip are more likely to do so in the future (despite the fact that seeing the flip is costly), while 
those that do not agree rarely pay money to flip the coin again. 
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4. Discussion 
In all three treatments, the money-maximizing prediction from game theory is that the loser of 
the coin flip will never choose to commit, as the expected value from conflict is strictly positive 
and the game is finitely repeated. Nevertheless, our experiment shows that individuals often 
avoid conflict in the finitely repeated game by committing to the outcome of a randomizing 
conflict resolution mechanism, even in the absence of binding contractual agreements. What can 
explain these non-zero levels of commitment? There are several reasons why commitment 
problems can be solved in the absence of external enforcement. First, if the parties expect to 
engage in repeated interaction, they may be able to overcome the commitment problem due to 
reputational concerns (Rabin, 1991; Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Dellarocas, 2006) or fear of 
incurring retaliation and spite (Abbink et al., 2010; Schniter et al., 2013; Lacomba et al., 2014; 
Mago et al., 2015). Similarly, some individuals may simply prefer to avoid conflict or be 
cooperative (Dorris, 1972; Molander, 1985), and given repeated interaction, they establish a 
reputation for cooperation that allows both parties to gain from exchange. As long as one 
member of the group is a cooperative type, the other member may be willing to forgo conflict to 
reap the gains from exchange (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982). For these reasons, it may not be that 
surprising that in all three treatments we observe substantial conflict resolution. 
One of the main research questions was whether commitment problems could be 
mitigated when participants are given the option of opting-in to the conflict resolution 
mechanism (with and without cost). Here, the failure of participants to opt-in reduced the 
frequency of conflict resolution relative to the exogenous case, and more so when seeing the flip 
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was costly. However, for participants that did opt-in, we observed significantly higher 
commitment, but only when opting-in was costly.  
Money-maximizing models do not predict these treatment differences. What can explain 
these differences in commitment rates? There are several non-mutually exclusive (and non-
exhaustive) possibilities. First, when individuals act collectively to propose a solution to a social 
dilemma, the result may be seen as more legitimate than when the proposed solution comes from 
“outside”, thus increasing cooperation levels. Evidence from both field studies and laboratory 
experiments suggests that endogenous participation in democratic institutions may encourage 
both cooperation and compliance (Dal Bo et al., 2010). Although we believe that legitimacy may 
play a role in helping groups to resolve commitment problems, our data do not provide support 
for this hypothesis. Specifically, the legitimacy hypothesis would suggest that since participants 
choose to opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, the coin flip outcome will acquire 
additional legitimacy in both participants’ eyes and will thus facilitate solving the commitment 
problem. Hence, we would expect commitment rates to be greater in both the Endogenous-Free 
and Endogenous-Costly treatments than in the Exogenous-Free treatment. However, we find no 
significant difference in commitment rates between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free 
treatments.  
A second possible explanation of our observations is that fears of retaliation and spite 
may discourage participants from reneging; i.e., opting-in and then not abiding by the outcome 
may encourage high bids by angered flip winners (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Dellarocas, 2006; 
Schniter et al., 2013; Lacomba et al., 2014). While we cannot rule out this explanation, our data 
do not reveal notable differences in the conflict expenditures of flip winners and losers. 
Additional unreported regressions (available upon request) indicate that the only significant 
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difference is that flip losers bid more than winners in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, which is 
opposite of the direction of the retaliation hypothesis. 
A third explanation is that individuals who pay to see the coin flip may be subject to a 
sunk cost fallacy; they might justify committing to the coin flip in order to avoid the regret of 
wasting money on unused advice (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Gino, 2008). We cannot rule out this 
explanation – though it seems implausible since the expected value of conflict is positive and 
greater than the sunk cost of seeing the flip. 
A final explanation receives the most substantial support from our data: the act of opting-
in may serve as a signal of a participant’s willingness to cooperate. That is, commitment is 
encouraged when both parties know that the other has deliberately sent a signal of willingness to 
cooperate, but this signal is more than cheap talk only when it involves incurring an opportunity 
cost. 17  Under this interpretation, the willingness to incur a cost of opting-in indicates a 
willingness to accept the outcome of the coin flip, and agents are able to infer cooperative 
intentions (to commit) more readily from costly opting-in than from free opting-in. In this sense, 
the mechanism encourages self-selection among cooperative types. In the repeated game setting, 
non-cooperative types are going to be found out early on unless they feign being a cooperative 
type. It may therefore be worthwhile to opt-in to see whether one is paired with a cooperative 
type, since they can always avoid the costly conflict resolution mechanism in the future after 
they have been cheated once. These considerations may explain why commitment rates are 
greater in treatments where opting-in is costly than when it is exogenous or costless. They may 
also explain why we find significant path dependence in the treatment where opting-in is costly 
                                                        
17 Indeed, there is evidence for this in other contexts where incurred opportunity costs facilitate reciprocity (McCabe 
et al., 2000, 2003; Schniter et al., 2013). 
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but not in the other treatments: once the players have sent each other costly signals in the past, 
coordinating around the cooperative outcome is easier in the future. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the effectiveness of non-binding institutions for conflict resolution and the 
effect of endogenous institutional choice on their success. Empirically, the main problem with 
such mechanisms is: how do groups commit to abiding by the outcome of a conflict resolution 
mechanism? This paper suggests that one way of mitigating this problem is to make the choice of 
opting-in to the mechanism costly. Although the mere act of opting-in has no significant impact 
on commitment rates, costly opting-in substantially increases commitment for groups who pay 
the price. 
Our results have important implications for the sustainability of cooperation and the 
mitigation of conflict in environments with repeated interaction and weak contract enforcement. 
First, using a coin flip as a conflict resolution mechanism has numerous benefits for studying the 
commitment problems inherent in conflict resolution: it is transparent and easy to understand, it 
provides an unbiased means of allocating indivisible resources (consistent with egalitarian 
norms), and its “all-or-nothing” nature exacerbates the commitment problem, since losing 
participants must commit to receiving nothing.18 Second, endogenizing and imposing a cost on 
the decision to opt-in can encourage reciprocity – by requiring individuals to undertake a cost to 
seek conflict resolution, the decision substantially increases the rate at which parties commit to 
                                                        
18 Using a random device as a conflict resolution mechanism has a long history. Iannaccone et al. (2011) argue that 
the Oracle at Delphi promoted cooperation amongst the Greek city-states despite providing random outcomes. 
Likewise, Leeson (2014) argues that the historical purpose of oracles was to resolve conflicts by correlating 
conflicting parties’ strategy randomization. Another well-known historical example of commitment to a random 
device is the battlefield agreement to settle a conflict by single combat between two renowned warriors. More 
familiar examples of conflict resolution via random device are abundant. Rock-paper-scissors, drawing straws, and 
throwing dice settle many friendly disputes. 
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conflict resolution. These and similar behavioral mechanisms are clearly important drivers of 
economic behavior and thus have an important role in any institutional design framework. When 
developing institutions to reduce conflict and facilitate mutually beneficial exchange, designers 
should consider not only standard incentive-compatibility issues but also the interaction between 
institutions and norms of cooperation and reciprocity. In particular, when the absence of 
exogenous enforcement mechanisms renders incentive-compatible arrangements infeasible, one 
way to reduce the costs of conflict may involve institutions designed to encourage reciprocity-
driven pro-sociality.  
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Table 1: Average Conflict Resolution, Opting-in, Commitment, Conflict Expenditures and 
Payoffs (Periods 5-29) 
 
  Treatment  
  
Exogenous-
Free 
Endogenous-
Free 
Endogenous-
Costly 
Joint 
Significance of 
Treatment 
Variables 
Conflict Resolution 0.54 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49)  0.20 (0.40) *# F(2,96) = 6.85 
 N = 550 N = 775 N = 1,150 p-value < 0.01  
      
Both Opt-In 1.00 0.71 (0.46) * 0.26 (0.44) *# F(1,75) = 28.17 
  N = 550 N = 775 N = 1,150 p-value < 0.01  
      
Both Commit  
(if Pair Reaches Stage 2) 
0.54 (0.50) 
N = 550 
0.58 (0.49) 0.76 (0.43) *@ F(2,73) = 28.17 
N = 547 N = 296 p-value = 0.06 
     
Flip-Loser Commits 0.58 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.78 (0.42) ^ F(2,73) = 2.39 
(if Pair Reaches Stage 2) N = 550 N = 547 N = 296 p-value = 0.09 
     
Conflict Expenditure  28.56 (18.93) 24.62 (20.08)  18.58 (19.27)*@ F(2,83) = 3.08 
 (if Pair Reaches Stage 3) N = 502 N = 912 N = 1,848 p-value = 0.05 
      
Payoff 
 
36.97 (52.54) 35.52 (51.59) 33.53 (51.19) F(2,96) = 0.51 
N = 1,100 N = 1,550 N = 2,300 p-value = 0.60 
Standard deviation reported in parentheses. Rows 1 through 4 report frequency, and rows 5 and 6 report the 
experimental currency francs, where 100 francs equals one US $1. Each reported variable was averaged over all 
periods per pair and the average was regressed against treatment dummy variables. For rows 3 through 5, we used 
probability-weighted regressions, as each pair did not always have the same number of observations (e.g., reached 
stage 2 or stage 3). Amounts noted with * signify the treatment coefficient was significantly different from the 
Exogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.05. Amounts noted with # signify the treatment coefficient was 
significantly different from the Endogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.05. Amounts noted with ^ signify the 
treatment coefficient was significantly different from the Exogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.10. Amounts 
noted with @ signify the treatment coefficient was significantly different from the Endogenous-Free coefficient, p-
value < 0.10. For row 2, * signifies the coefficient is significantly different from 1, p-value < 0.01. 
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Table 2: Average Endgame Effects, by Treatment 
 
  Periods 
Treatment Variable 20-29 30 
Exogenous-Free Both Opt-In 1.00 1.00 
 Both Commit 0.51 0.36 
 Winner Commits 0.94 0.86 
 Conflict Expenditure 28.8 24.9 
    
Endogenous-Free Both Opt-In 0.67 0.71 
 Both Commit 0.60 0.23 
 Winner Commits 0.98 0.95 
 Conflict Expenditure 23.7 29.1 
    
Endogenous-Costly Both Opt-In 0.25 0.24 
 Both Commit 0.85 0.45 
 Winner Commits 1.00 0.91 
 Conflict Expenditure 17.6 19.4 
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Table 3: Transition Matrix of Actions, Periods 5-29 
 
    Exogenous-Free Endogenous-Free Endogenous-Costly 
Period t Period t+1 Period t+1 Period t+1 
Player i Player j 
Player i 
Flip 
Player i  
Don't Flip N 
Player i 
Flip 
Player i  
Don't Flip N   
Player i 
Flip 
Player i 
Don't Flip N   
Flip Flip       0.824 0.176 1098   0.709 0.291 598   
Flip Don't Flip N/A   0.924 0.076 211   0.670 0.330 448   
Don't Flip Either       0.863 0.137 241   0.247 0.753 1254   
Period t Period t+1 Period t+1 Period t+1 
Player i Player j 
Player i 
Flip 
Player i 
Don't Flip N 
Player i 
Flip 
Player i  
Don't Flip N   
Player i 
Flip 
Player i 
Don't Flip N   
Agrees Agrees       0.799 0.201 636   0.784 0.216 444   
Agrees Don't Agree N/A   0.876 0.124 225   0.514 0.486 72   
Don't Agree Either       0.844 0.156 237   0.476 0.524 82   
  Period t+1 Period t+1 Period t+1 
Period t 
Both 
choose 
Agree 
At least one 
chooses  
Don’t Agree N 
Both 
choose 
Agree 
At least one 
chooses  
Don’t Agree 
Don't 
Flip N 
Both 
choose 
Agree 
At least one 
chooses  
Don’t Agree 
Don't 
Flip N 
Both choose Agree 0.560 0.440 600 0.267 0.352 0.381 636 0.685 0.027 0.288 444 
At least one chooses Don't Agree 0.524 0.476 500 0.502 0.229 0.268 462 0.078 0.156 0.766 154 
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Figure 1: Game Tree  
 
 
 
  
Player 1 
Player 2 
Flip Don’t Flip 
Don’t Flip Flip Flip Don’t Flip 
Stage 1:  
Opting-in 
Player 1 
Player 2 
Agree Don’t Agree 
Don’t Agree Agree Agree Don’t Agree 
Both Players See 
Results of Flip 
Expected payoff 
π1 = v/2 - c 
π2 = v/2 - c 
Stage 2: 
Commitment 
Stage 3: 
Contest 
Expected payoff 
π1 = ve1/(e1+e2) - e1 - c 
π2 = ve2/(e1+e2) - e2 - c 
Stage 3: 
Contest 
Expected payoff 
π1 = ve1/(e1+e2) – e1 
π2 = ve2/(e1+e2) – e2 
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Figure 2: Probability of Both Opting-in vs. Conditional Probability of Both Committing 
(Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly Treatments, Periods 5-29) 
 
 
Note: Each point represents the probability of opting-in and the conditional probability of commitment for a single 
pair over periods 5-29; the lines plot smoothing spline fits to the data with 3 DF. 
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Figure 3: Average Profits, Opting-in, and Commitment by Pair and Treatment 
 (Periods 5-29) 
 
 
Note: Each column displays the average of three variables for a single pair over periods 5-29. Colored bars represent 
profits, black dots represent the opt-in rate, and black x’s represent the commitment rate, conditional on opting-in. 
The pairs are sorted by opt-in rate with ties broken by commitment rate, and then profit to allow visual identification 
of relationships between the variables. Note, that there is a strong relationship between commitment and profit only 
in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments. 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication) – Instructions 
 
Instructions for the Exogenous-Free Treatment 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn 
an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash.  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The 
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we sum your total earnings for all 30 periods 
and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate you 
following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each 
period. 
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-participant groups. You and the 
other participant in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30 
periods. You will remain within the same two-participant group for all 30 periods.  
In each period of the experiment one of the two participants in your group will receive the reward. The 
reward is worth 100 francs. Each period of the experiment consists of as many as two decision stages.  
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1 
Before making a decision in Stage 1, the computer will flip a coin. There is a 50% chance the coin lands 
heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If the computer coin lands heads one participant will receive the reward, 
if it lands tails, the other participant receives the reward. The flip outcome determines who receives the reward. So, 
there are two possible payoffs: 
If You Receive the Reward     Earnings = 100 
If The Other Participant Receives the Reward  Earnings = 0 
  In Stage 1, both participants will have to choose whether they want to Agree to the outcome of a computer 
coin flip. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
If you want to agree, check Agree. If both participants choose to Agree, the computer will assign earnings 
to participants according to the coin flip and the period is over, meaning that neither participant enters Stage 2. 
However, if either participant chooses Don’t Agree, then both participants will enter Stage 2. 
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YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2 
If either participant checked Don’t Agree in Stage 1, each participant enters Stage 2. In this stage, each 
participant may bid for the 100 franc reward. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 100. An 
example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant bids, the 
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid, you will receive 1 lottery ticket and 
for each franc the other participant bids, the other participant will receives 1 lottery ticket. After both participants 
make their bids, the computer will draw randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each ticket has an equal chance of 
winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total 
number of tickets bought by you and the other participant. 
Chance of Receiving the Reward = Your Total Lottery Tickets 
 Sum of Your and Other Participant’s Lottery Tickets 
If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants. 
After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who 
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in the 
following way: 
 If either participant decided Don’t Agree in Stage 1: 
If you receive the reward:    Earnings = 100 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 2,000 francs). In any period, 
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will sum the total earnings for 
all 30 periods of the experiment and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we 
will subtract them from your participation fee. If the summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your 
participation fee. 
 
An Example 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of 100 
francs. If you bid 30 francs and the other participant bids 20 francs, then you receive 30 lottery tickets and the other 
participant receives 20 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 50 (30 + 20). As 
you can see, you have a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.60 = 30/50. The other participant has a 0.40 = 
20/50 chance of receiving the reward. 
 After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the 
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you received the 
reward or not. 
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 At the end of each period, the computer will display all decision in all three stages on the outcome screen. 
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet 
under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 In each period, you and another participant have the opportunity to receive a reward worth 100 francs. 
Before making a decision in Stage 1, the computer will flip a coin. In Stage 1 the outcome of the coin flip is 
revealed, and both participants choose either Agree or Don’t Agree. If both participants choose Agree, the outcome 
of the coin flip is made final and the payoffs are computed for each participant. On the other hand, if either 
participant chooses Don’t Agree in Stage 1, both participants enter Stage 2. Then, each participant submits a bid for 
the reward, and the reward is allocated by a random computerized draw. Are there any questions? 
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Instructions for the Endogenous-Free Treatment 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn 
an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash.  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The 
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we sum your total earnings for all 30 periods 
and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate you 
following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each 
period. 
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-participant groups. You and the 
other participant in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30 
periods. You will remain within the same two-participant group for all 30 periods.  
In each period of the experiment one of the two participants in your group will receive the reward. The 
reward is worth 100 francs. Each period of the experiment consists of as many as three decision stages.  
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1 
In Stage 1, both participants will have the opportunity to choose whether they want to Flip a computer coin 
in order to determine who will receive the reward. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
If you want to flip the coin, check Flip. If both participants choose Flip, then both participants will enter 
Stage 2. However, if either participant chooses Don’t Flip, then both participants will skip Stage 2 and enter Stage 
3. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2 
If both participants choose Flip in Stage 1, the computer will flip a coin. There is a 50% chance the coin 
lands heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If the computer coin lands heads one participant will receive the 
reward, if it lands tails, the other participant receives the reward. The flip outcome determines who receives the 
reward. So, there are two possible payoffs: 
If You Receive the Reward     Earnings = 100 
If The Other Participant Receives the Reward  Earnings = 0 
In Stage 2, both participants will have to choose whether they want to Agree to the outcome of a computer 
coin flip. An example of your decision screen is shown below.  
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If you want to agree, check Agree. If both participants choose to Agree, the computer will assign earnings 
to participants according to the coin flip and the period is over, meaning that neither participant enters Stage 3. 
However, if either participant chooses Don’t Agree, then both participants will enter Stage 3. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 3 
If either participant checked Don’t Flip in Stage 1 or checked Don’t Agree in Stage 2, each participant 
enters Stage 3. In this stage, each participant may bid for the 100 franc reward. You may bid any integer number 
of francs between 0 and 100. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant bids, the 
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid, you will receive 1 lottery ticket and 
for each franc the other participant bids, the other participant will receives 1 lottery ticket. After both participants 
make their bids, the computer will draw randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each ticket has an equal chance of 
winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total 
number of tickets bought by you and the other participant. 
Chance of Receiving the Reward = Your Total Lottery Tickets 
 Sum of Your and Other Participant’s Lottery Tickets 
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If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants. 
After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who 
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in the 
following way: 
 If either participant decided Don’t Flip in Stage 1: 
If you receive the reward:    Earnings = 100 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
 If both participants decided Flip in Stage 1, but either participant decided Don’t Agree in Stage 2: 
If you receive the reward:    Earnings = 100 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 2,000 francs). In any period, 
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will sum the total earnings for 
all 30 periods of the experiment and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we 
will subtract them from your participation fee. If the summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your 
participation fee. 
 
An Example 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of 100 
francs. If you bid 30 francs and the other participant bids 20 francs, then you receive 30 lottery tickets and the other 
participant receives 20 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 50 (30 + 20). As 
you can see, you have a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.60 = 30/50. The other participant has a 0.40 = 
20/50 chance of receiving the reward. 
 After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the 
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you received the 
reward or not. 
 At the end of each period, the computer will display all decision in all three stages on the outcome screen. 
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet 
under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 In each period, you and another participant have the opportunity to receive a reward worth 100 francs. In 
Stage 1 each participant chooses either Flip or Don’t Flip. If both participants choose Flip, then the experiment 
moves to Stage 2. In Stage 2 the outcome of the coin flip is revealed, and both participants choose either Agree or 
Don’t Agree. If both participants choose Agree, the outcome of the coin flip is made final and the payoffs are 
computed for each participant. On the other hand, if either participant chooses Don’t Flip in Stage 1 or if either 
participant chooses Don’t Agree in Stage 2, both participants enter Stage 3. Then, each participant submits a bid for 
the reward, and the reward is allocated by a random computerized draw. Are there any questions?  
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Instructions for the Endogenous-Costly Treatment 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn 
an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash.  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The 
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we sum your total earnings for all 30 periods 
and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate you 
following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each 
period. 
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-participant groups. You and the 
other participant in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30 
periods. You will remain within the same two-participant group for all 30 periods.  
In each period of the experiment one of the two participants in your group will receive the reward. The 
reward is worth 100 francs. Each period of the experiment consists of as many as three decision stages.  
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1 
In Stage 1, both participants will have the opportunity to choose whether they want to Flip a computer coin 
in order to determine who will receive the reward. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
If you want to flip the coin, check Flip. If both participants choose Flip, the computer will subtract 5 
francs from both participants’ earnings for the period, and both participants will enter Stage 2. However, if either 
participant chooses Don’t Flip, then both participants will skip Stage 2 and enter Stage 3, and the 5 francs will not 
be subtracted from either participant. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2 
If both participants choose Flip in Stage 1, the computer will flip a coin. There is a 50% chance the coin 
lands heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If the computer coin lands heads one participant will receive the 
reward, if it lands tails, the other participant receives the reward. The flip outcome determines who receives the 
reward. So, there are two possible payoffs: 
If You Receive the Reward     Earnings = 100 – 5 francs 
If The Other Participant Receives the Reward  Earnings = 0 – 5 francs 
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In Stage 2, both participants will have to choose whether they want to Agree to the outcome of a computer 
coin flip. An example of your decision screen is shown below.  
 
If you want to agree, check Agree. If both participants choose to Agree, the computer will assign earnings 
to participants according to the coin flip and the period is over, meaning that neither participant enters Stage 3. 
However, if either participant chooses Don’t Agree, then both participants will enter Stage 3, but the 5 francs will 
be subtracted from both participants since they have agreed in Stage 1 to flip a coin. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 3 
If either participant checked Don’t Flip in Stage 1 or checked Don’t Agree in Stage 2, each participant 
enters Stage 3. In this stage, each participant may bid for the 100 franc reward. You may bid any integer number 
of francs between 0 and 100. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant bids, the 
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid, you will receive 1 lottery ticket and 
for each franc the other participant bids, the other participant will receives 1 lottery ticket. After both participants 
make their bids, the computer will draw randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each ticket has an equal chance of 
winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total 
number of tickets bought by you and the other participant. 
Chance of Receiving the Reward = Your Total Lottery Tickets 
 Sum of Your and Other Participant’s Lottery Tickets 
If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants. 
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After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who 
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in the 
following way: 
If either participant decided Don’t Flip in Stage 1: 
If you receive the reward:    Earnings = 100 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
If both participants decided Flip in Stage 1, but either participant decided Don’t Agree in Stage 2: 
If you receive the reward:    Earnings = 100 – Your Bid – 5 francs 
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = 0 – Your Bid – 5 francs 
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 2,000 francs). In any period, 
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will sum the total earnings for 
all 30 periods of the experiment and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we 
will subtract them from your participation fee. If the summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your 
participation fee. 
 
An Example 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of 100 
francs. If you bid 30 francs and the other participant bids 20 francs, then you receive 30 lottery tickets and the other 
participant receives 20 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 50 (30 + 20). As 
you can see, you have a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.60 = 30/50. The other participant has a 0.40 = 
20/50 chance of receiving the reward. 
After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the 
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you received the 
reward or not. 
At the end of each period, the computer will display all decision in all three stages on the outcome screen. 
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet 
under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 In each period, you and another participant have the opportunity to receive a reward worth 100 francs. In 
Stage 1 each participant chooses either Flip or Don’t Flip. If both participants choose Flip, then both participants 
pay 5 francs and the experiment moves to Stage 2. In Stage 2 the outcome of the coin flip is revealed, and both 
participants choose either Agree or Don’t Agree. If both participants choose Agree, the outcome of the coin flip is 
made final and the payoffs are computed for each participant. On the other hand, if either participant chooses Don’t 
Flip in Stage 1 or if either participant chooses Don’t Agree in Stage 2, both participants enter Stage 3. Then, each 
participant submits a bid for the reward, and the reward is allocated by a random computerized draw. Are there any 
questions? 
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Appendix B (For Online Publication) – Additional Figures 
 
Figure B1: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Exogenous-Free Treatment 
 
 
Note: Panels ordered from the top by probability of conflict. 
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Figure B2: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Endogenous-Free Treatment 
 
 
Note: Panels ordered from the top by probability of conflict. 
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Figure B3: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Endogenous-Costly Treatment 
 
 
Note: Panels ordered from the top by probability of conflict. 
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Figure B4: Probability of Both Opting-in vs. Conditional Probability of Both Committing 
(Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly Treatments, All Periods) 
 
 
Note: Each point represents the probability of opting-in and the conditional probability of commitment for a single 
pair over all 30 periods; the lines plot smoothing spline fits to the data with 3 DF. 
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Figure B5: Average Profits, Opting-in and Commitment by Pair and Treatment  
 (All Periods) 
 
 
Note: Each column displays the average of three variables for a single pair over periods 1-30. Colored bars represent 
profits, black dots represent the opt-in rate, and black x’s represent the commitment rate, conditional on opting-in. 
The pairs are sorted by opt-in rate with ties broken by commitment rate, and then profit to allow visual identification 
of relationships between the variables. Note, e.g., that there is a strong relationship between commitment and profit 
only in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments. 
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Table B1: Transition Matrix of Actions, Periods 5-29, Flip Losers Only 
 
    Exogenous-Free Endogenous-Free Endogenous-Costly 
Period t Period t+1 Period t+1 Period t+1 
    Both flip 
At least one 
doesn't flip N Both flip 
At least one 
doesn't flip N   Both flip 
At least one 
doesn't flip N   
Flip loser agrees 
N/A 
0.632 0.368 334   0.704 0.296 226   
Flip loser doesn't agree 0.721 0.279 215   0.233 0.767 73   
  Period t+1 Period t+1 Period t+1 
Period t Flip loser 
agrees 
Flip loser 
doesn't 
agree N 
Flip loser 
agrees 
Flip loser 
doesn't 
agree 
No 
Flip N 
Flip loser 
agrees 
Flip loser 
doesn't 
agree 
No 
Flip N 
Flip loser agrees 0.588 0.412 318 0.293 0.338 0.368 334 0.677 0.027 0.296 226 
Flip loser doesn't agree 0.560 0.440 232 0.540 0.181 0.279 215 0.096 0.137 0.767 73 
 
